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Abstract
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to formulate a novel model for enhancing the effectiveness of 
existing Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR) schemes by leveraging the capabilities of cyber threat 
information sharing.
Design/methodology/approach - This paper employs a quantitative methodology to identify the 
most popular Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) elements and introduces a lightweight approach to 
correlate those with potential forensic value resulting in the quick and accurate triaging and 
identification of patterns of malicious activities.
Findings - While threat intelligence exchange steadily becomes a common practice for the prevention 
or detection of security incidents, the proposed approach highlights its usefulness for the Digital 
Forensics (DF) domain.
Originality/value – The proposed model can help organizations to improve their digital forensic 
readiness posture and thus minimize the time and cost of cybercrime incidents.
1. Introduction
Assisted by the proliferation of sophisticated, free, or low-cost malware toolkits, attackers can easily 
produce various samples of badware while staying undetected even by the most updated anti-malware 
software solutions. It is estimated that approximately 600 million malware samples appeared by the 
end of 2016, while the average lifespan of malware file hashes is less than an hour (European Union 
Agency For Network And Information Security (ENISA), 2017).
Such threats require efficient digital forensics mechanisms. Digital Forensics has been maturing over 
the past four decades, but developments within the Information Technology (IT) industry and the 
disruptive nature of IT innovation challenge its effectiveness (Garfinkel, 2010). 
The need for time efficient and cost effective DF were the reasons the concept of Digital Forensic 
Readiness emerged (Tan, 2001). However, research in DFR is yet at an abstract level, with most of 
the academic publications containing generic steps for DFR modeling, while lacking 
contextualization.
The contribution of this paper is the development of a holistic DFR methodology which combines 
elements from the fields of Information Security, Digital Forensics, and Cyber Threat Intelligence to 
facilitate the DFR process. This approach aims to efficiently analyze, correlate and discover potential 
threats by cross-matching diverse large-volume e-evidences, collected from the local operational 
environment achieving to reduce the analysis time and cost, required to detect and respond to security 
incidents. 
This paper is structured as follows. A brief review of the current threat landscape and the existing 
defense approaches are reported in the introduction. Section 2 presents the background work in the 
fields of DF, DFR, and CTI. Section 3 discusses the architecture of the proposed model while section 
4 presents a prototype of the model implemented. Section 5 outlines the results of the initial 
experiments and section 6 outlines the benefits of this research.
2. Background theory and related work
2.1 Digital Forensics and Digital Forensic Readiness
According to (Grobler and Louwrens, 2007; Kebande and Venter, 2015; Palmer, 2001; Pangalos and 
Katos, 2010; Rowlingson, 2004), DF is a methodology that utilizes scientifically proven methods 
towards the preservation, identification, acquisition, analysis, interpretation and documentation of 
digital data and/or root cause analysis and presentation of digital sources for reconstructing suspicious 
events. The above definition indicates that DF mainly concerns about forensic procedures, rules of 
evidence, and legal approaches, but lacks consideration for big volume and quality of collected data.
Page 1 of 25 Information and Computer Security
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Inform
ation and Com
puter Security
DFR is a term that firstly introduced by (Tan, 2001), and aims to maximize the associated mechanisms 
‘capability of collecting DF data, whilst minimizing the cost of forensic investigation during incident 
response (Rowlingson, 2004). Achieving forensic readiness presumes the coordination of multiple 
factors like legislation, people, processes, policies, governance, and technology (Grobler et al., 2010). 
Proactive readiness, in turn, must take into account several factors like data collection, analysis, and 
storage methodologies limitations. The next section discusses existing methodologies of DFR 
systems.
2.2  Digital Forensic Readiness Systems
The need for immediate response to incidents has driven the proposal of various DFR Systems. 
Focusing on WLAN communications Ngobeni et al. (Ngobeni et al., 2012) described a model that 
proactively collects, analyses and stores network traffic that is exchanged between wireless devices 
and access points, and is thus present and easily retrievable.
Spyridopoulos & Katos (Spyridopoulos and Katos, 2011) introduced the concept of forcing cloud 
node failures to cause the transfer of digital evidence between jurisdictions aiming to solve the 
challenges of evidence collection efficiently. However, such a strategy would potentially cause a 
significant up-rise of high-volume data transfers. 
Kebande et al. (Kebande et al., 2016) presented an approach for achieving forensics readiness in the 
cloud. Their work employs non-malicious bots that inject cloud machines and transfer potential 
evidence to a centralized data store where pre-incident detection and analysis takes place. 
Inspired by well-established Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and Security Event Management 
solutions (SEMs), the digital forensic readiness management system Reddy and Venter (Reddy and 
Venter, 2013) proposed aims to coordinate the mass amount of resources an organization possesses 
and thus improve its readiness state. The system collects events from various resources, compares 
them against a predefined set of definitions and alerts users for taking further actions.
Following a different approach Shields et al. (2011) introduced a system that is designed to answer 
queries about user actions. In essence, they achieved user tracking through the analysis of a calculated 
set of terms produced by the files each user accessed. (Shields et al., 2011). 
2.3 Cyber Threat Intelligence
Threat Intelligence is analyzed information about the intent, opportunity, and capability of malicious 
actors, concerning potential or current attacks threaten an organization. Also known as Cyber Threat 
Intelligence, refers to what cyber threat information becomes after collected, evaluated in the context 
of its source and reliability, organized, analyzed through rigorous and structured tradecraft techniques 
and refined by security analysts. The primary purpose of threat intelligence is helping organizations 
understand the risks of the most common and severe external threats, such as advanced persistent 
threats (APTs) and zero-day exploits. Threat Intelligence includes in-depth information about specific 
threats to help organizations protect themselves from the types of attacks that could do them the most 
damage (Wigmore, 2015).
Conventional Information Security defense techniques for detecting and mitigating security incidents 
raise questions about their effectiveness, as they are time-critical. According to Verizon (Verizon, 
2018), 87% of compromises occurred within minutes are often unable to identify incidents that rely 
on zero-day exploits. On the other hand, recent developments in the domain of Big Data and Cyber 
Threat Intelligence seems to better serve the cyber-war battle, and thus seem to be very promising 
approaches (Virvilis et al., 2014).
Several frameworks have been developed that aim to describe and share threat intelligence in a 
structured manner. STIX (MITRE, 2017), OpenIoC (Mandiant Corporation, 2013) and IODEF 
(Danyliw et al., 2007) are among them, with the former being considered the de facto threat 
intelligence representative (Sauerwein et al., 2017). Using markup languages like XML and JSON, 
these frameworks can communicate threat information between systems without user intervention, 
thus narrowing the time needed to respond to security incidents. 
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2.4 Threat Intelligence Platforms
The need for effectively managing threat information has emerged the development of Threat 
Intelligence Platforms (TIPs). TIPs are repositories of threats that enable organizations to collect, 
analyze, integrate external intelligence and even develop their own. The utmost goal of any TIP is to 
share intelligence that will be embedded into organizational workflows and would serve decision 
makers (ENISA, 2017).
TIPs are divided into three categories, namely open source, commercial and community-based. Open 
source TIPs like CRITs, CIF, GOSINT, MANTIS, and MISP are freely available tools that collect, 
correlate and exchange information about threats. Commercial TIPs like ThreatStream, EclecticIQ, 
Soltra Edge, and ThreatConnect, are paid services that aim to provide registered organizations 
intelligence about cyber threats and thus assist them to react to incidents. Community-based TIPs like 
Alienvault OTX, Facebook Threat Exchange and IBM X-Force Exchange are online platforms that 
allow subscribers to mutually exchange intelligence about cyber threats (ENISA, 2017).
While CTI solutions are considered very promising approaches for building a strong Information 
Security posture (Pomenon Institute, 2015), to the knowledge of the authors they are rarely used to 
improve the DFR levels of organizations. The next section presents a novel approach for filling this 
gap.
3. The Threat Intelligence Informed DFR Model
In their previous work (Serketzis et al., 2017), the authors proposed a generic framework for 
enhancing DFR using threat intelligence. This framework involves the following main steps:
 Use of threat intelligence sharing techniques to collect, store, analyze, and correlate IOCs, from 
various sources, in the form of graphs. 
 Collect, correlate, preprocess and store logs from various security devices of an organization. 
 Correlation of the two sets, IOCs and logs, and identification of relationships between them, 
with the aim to create an effective subset of event logs (triage) that an investigator can primarily 
consult, in the event of an incident.
This paper extends the above framework by introducing a methodology that employs Indicators of 
Compromise (IoCs) selected from diverse sources, formulated and normalized for compatibility 
reasons and finally cross-matched against locally collected logs, aiming to discover potential threats. 
The above loose methodology steps are framed into three newly created modules, namely “IoC 
Collection Module”, “Audit Log Processing Module”, and “Threat Identification Module” that 
operate independently (Figure 1) while coordinated to present an effective DFR model. The proposed 
methodology offers automated methods for discovering threats resulting in a time efficient DFR 
model.
3.1 IoC type selection methodology
Threat intelligence is often presented in the form of IoCs, and different TIPs incorporate various IoC 
structures, including characteristics such as IP addresses, URLs and hash values. For example, STIX 
v2 utilizes 19 objects (MITRE, 2017), each containing several properties, while OpenIoC v1.1 
contains 599 IoC properties (Mandiant Corporation, 2013). Although these called IoC components, 
objects or properties attempt to cover all systems’ characteristics, they are rarely all used in practice 
(Tounsi and Rais, 2018). One of the advantages of this methodology is to discover and propose the 
most commonly used ones with the highest forensic value, thus improving the efficiency of the 
forensic discovery process.
The methodology reviewed the IoC characteristics provided by the most well-known TIPs, referred 
at Table 1. This review revealed eight common IoC characteristics. In particular, Table 1 indicates 
that IP addresses and hash values are the most commonly exchanged IoCs. Feeds containing URLs 
and Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) also appear frequently among the data sources. Some 
sources share emails, filenames, mutexes and registry values. However, the amount of those IoCs is 
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limited. It is worth noting that data sources label IoCs differently. For example, labels “Domain” 
“Host” and “FQDN” usually represent the same IoCs.
Moreover, a statistical analysis of IoCs within the two most renown open access TIPs, Alienvault 
(Figure 2) and ThreatConnect (Figure 3) confirmed the above-mentioned findings. 
3.2 IoC Collection Module
3.2.1 IoC Selection
The purpose and methodology for generating IoCs vary. Some IoCs are produced manually, like the 
ones security analysts produce after examining malware samples, while others can be downloaded 
from IoC sources. Although there are many IoC characteristics like the ones presented in Section 3.1, 
only a few are frequently used in practice (Tounsi and Rais, 2018). 
One of the main criteria for selecting IoC sources is the type of threats an organization faces and 
expects to defend. Apart from that, the nature of organizations, the geographic areas they operate, and 
the legislative regime they depend on, are some of the additional factors that play a significant role 
in the IoC source selection process. Another criterion is the level of exposure of their assets to those 
threats. So, it becomes clear that selecting IoC sources is a complex procedure, which must comply 
with an organization’s Information Security policy.
3.2.2 IoC Collection
Ideally, IoCs are obtained directly from sharing platforms using technologies such as STIX and 
TAXII. However, not all IoC repositories support automated approaches, thus, a hybrid IoC collection 
process would be feasible. This newly developed hybrid mechanism utilizes custom agents that 
connect to TIPs and obtain their content through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). In 
special cases, it is also possible for end-users to add or elaborate IoCs manually to further optimize 
the collected information. 
3.2.3 IoC Filtering
IoC data sources share vast amounts of IoCs, but so e of them can challenge the effectiveness of the 
model. For instance, non-filtering private IP addresses (IANA, 2017) may produce correlation errors. 
In particular, the experiments revealed that different malware families shared common IoCs, like 
established network connections to loopback addresses, and thus inaccurately seem to correlate. 
Moreover, experiments indicated that DNS services like “dyndns.org”, “no-ip.com” and so forth, 
might generate false positives with regards to malware family correlations. Thus, these IoCs need to 
be carefully handled during the filtering process. Also, IoC filtering seems to improve the efficiency 
of the model by excluding IoCs (domains, hostnames, URLs, IP addresses) that relate to the Alexa’s 
top one million domains list. As such, it becomes clear that filtering for imported IoCs is crucial and 
is supported by the proposed model. 
3.2.4 IoC Correlation
IoC correlation refers to the information contained in the adjacency matrix of a connected graph 
between the different entities, namely IoCs, TIP sources and malware objects. Every IoC that have 
passed the filtering phase is imported to the Local IoC Database. In parallel a pre-configured set of 
TIP sources is queried to reveal any relationships an IoC may have. These relationships among IoCs 
are explained in the next section. For instance, the authors consider the fan-in of an IoC from TIP 
sources to be representative of the assurance, quality, and reliability of the IoC, whereas the existence 
of links between IoCs will contribute to the forensic discovery process as this provides the potential 
to reveal intrinsic relationships between security incidents, threat actors, and families of malware. As 
an example, figure 4 shows a minimal graph with two TIPs sharing the same IoC. However, as noted 
later both in the Local IoC Database and the implementation sections, graphs describing real cases 
are far more complex, illustrating the importance of both IoC correlation and filtering. 
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3.2.5 IoC Database
Although the methodology presented in section 3.1 identifies the most common types of IoCs, 
scalability and correlation needs are the primary factors that shape the IoC storage architecture. 
Relational databases require the definition of an initial schema, which is more restrictive and gives 
less flexibility when it comes to schema modifications. In turn, graph databases are designed for better 
performance with highly interdependent data. Such database models employ nodes as data 
repositories and edges as the inline relationships among them. The ability to pre-materialize those 
relationships improve the performance of complex queries. Moreover, graph databases are by nature 
schema-less which overcomes the scaling issues that relational databases face and are thus considered 
a viable solution for storing IoCs (Mahmood et al., 2014; Moniruzzaman and Hossain, 2013; Nayak 
et al., 2013; Neo4j, 2017). 
The need for a robust, extensible, interconnected IoC repository platform and the fact that an initial 
schema is not a preliminary requirement, makes graph databases an ideal structure for the proposed 
model. Influenced by the STIX framework, the architecture of the proposed IoC database uses nodes 
as objects of various types IoCs and edges to describe their relationships respectively. Both objects 
and their relationships can contain a collection of properties. Also, while it is possible for graph 
databases to have bi-directional relationships, it is not efficient (Neo4j, 2017), and not a requirement. 
Therefore, this model only supports directed edges. The proposed IoC database schema is presented 
in figure 5 along with and described in more detail in the following subsections. 
File Object 
File hashes as IoCs are prevalent in malware analysis for labeling and indexing malware samples. 
Calculated hash values are properties of the File Object for the unique identification of malware 
related files. While there are many algorithms for calculating hash values, MD5, SHA1 and SHA256 
are the ones TIPs most commonly use and thus become properties of the File Object. The complete 
File Object description of properties is shown in Error! Reference source not found..
Typical static malware analysis can reveal that File Objects may relate with IP addresses, URLs, 
FQDNs, and emails (Modi and Doupé, 2017), however, in-depth analysis can unveil more 
relationships like mutexes and files that are created, opened, deleted or otherwise handled (Error! 
Reference source not found.). Moreover, File Objects can point to Malware counterparts providing 
analysts with additional information about malicious files themselves.
IP Address Object
As mentioned earlier, an IP Address Object is a prominent type of IoC. IP addresses are essential 
elements of the layer three network connectivity analysis and their presence in cyber investigations 
can potentially reveal valuable information about the tools, the tactics and the procedures (TTP) 
malware attackers use. For instance, most sophisticated attacks employ command and control servers 
(C2) for administering malware instances. Identifying IP addresses of C2 servers are significant leads 
allowing cyber analysts to trace attackers. Error! Reference source not found. depicts the structure 
of the IP Address object and the way it relates with other objects. 
FQDN Object 
A fully qualified domain name (FQDN) is the complete domain name for a specific computer, or host, 
on the Internet. It consists of two parts, the “hostname” and the “domain name” (Indiana University, 
2017). As shown in section 3.1, both FQDNs and their associated domain names are frequently used 
as IoCs, as they describe internet nodes, so both FQDN and Domain IoCs can be hosted under the 
same object as they are similar. 
FQDN and IP Address Objects can establish direct relationships that are marked with the label 
“RESOLVES TO”. As shown in the diagram (Error! Reference source not found.), relationships 
can also exist between two FQDN objects, in cases of child-parent (FQDN-Domain) nodes or domain 
aliases. 
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URL Object 
In contrast to FQDN objects that can abstractly describe the contents of a network source, Universal 
Resource Locators (URL) directly point to specific web addresses. Such information is sometimes 
valuable for the investigation process because it provides the forensic examiner with a holistic view 
of an attacker’s originating attack path. Under certain circumstances, it can also provide the 
opportunity to fully replicate an attack up to the application layer in a safe environment, thus 
supporting a better understanding on how it operates and to examine the extent of the attack at the 
specific environment (i.e., malware forensics).
Text containing the full URL path is the main attribute of the URL Objects of this model. For 
efficiency reasons, URL is further decomposed into five attributes (protocol, port, directory, filename, 
parameters) that become properties of the URL Object itself. Both the properties and the relationships 
of this object are presented in Error! Reference source not found. 5.
Email Address Object
One of the primary targets attackers may have is the establishment of secure channels giving them to 
control over the infected systems and exfiltrate data. For this reason, one of the steps that precede an 
attack is the acquisition of one or more remote systems that will be used as a stepping stone to break 
into the targeted systems. Stepping stone attacks are commonly used as attribution evasion techniques 
and pose significant challenges to the forensic analyst.
At the same time, hardcoded IP addresses are not preferred by attackers who often tend to use FQDNs 
that are more dynamic and easily co figurable during the preparation of an attack (e.g., during the 
weaponization phase). 
Employing FQDN usually presumes a prior registration of a domain name, which in turn requires a 
valid email address. While registering a free email address is a relatively straightforward process, 
such information is often crucial for investigations, as it can be used to reveal malicious actors. Also, 
email addresses can be indicators of ownership of FQDNs (e.g. domain administrators of FQDN 
“example.com” can only create emails like info@example.com). Figure 5 shows how the Email 
Object fits within the Local IoC Database.
Mutex Object 
Mutex (Mutual Exclusive) is a method commonly used to avoid concurrent access to a specific 
resource. Malware developers usually employ mutexes to deter variants of a particular malware being 
installed on the same system which will be detrimental to the malware itself and system and will 
potentially allow its detection. At this point, malware instances try to identify whether a mutex exists 
on the compromised system when they are first executed. The presence of that mutex on the system 
reveals that the malware is already installed (Blasco, 2009).
Forensic analysts also apply the same techniques to discover malicious software running on a system. 
In this case, a list of previously known mutexes is used in the form of IoCs. It thus becomes clear that 
mutexes are essential elements for investigations and thus the proposed model includes them as 
additional objects.
Mutexes do not have a common format. Rather, they are text values threat actors define to evaluate 
the existence of multiple malware instances. Thus, the “Mutex” key is the only property the Mutex 
Object contains. Mutexes appear when files execute and consequently relate to them. However, the 
relationships between these two objects have already been described at the File Object section. 
DataSource Object
The DataSource Object is a supplementary structure in the IoC database. This object does not store 
IoCs; rather it keeps information about the origin of every IoC stored in the IoC database. Every 
object described above relates to the Datasource Object, and this is why it is presented in figure 5 as 
an external entity to the IoC structure (objects within the rounded retackle).
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Malware Object
Similar to DataSource, the Malware Object is the element that describes incidents that possibly 
challenged or bypassed an organization’s security measures. The properties it contains can provide 
abstract information about malware instances including malware name, description and the category 
it belongs. The relationships of the Malware Object have already been described at the File Object 
section.
3.3 The Audit Log Processing Module
The diverse logging formats and the ever-increasing volume of audit data modern information 
systems produce pose significant difficulties in their efficient management (Chuvakin et al., 2012; 
Mahmood and Afzal, 2013).
The Audit Log Processing Module collects and stores data from various sources in a centralized 
manner and transforms them accordingly, in order to easily be queried against the IoC database. 
Detailed analysis of the processes of the Audit Log Processing Module follows.
3.3.1 Audit Log Collection
The Audit Log Collection process contains a set of pre-configured agents that gather audit logs 
produced from security systems and devices. These agents can operate in active and passive mode 
depending on the limitations of the auditing source. For instance, in cases where collection agents 
cannot be installed on devices due to computational limitations, listeners deployed on more powerful 
nodes for event data capturing would be a more feasible approach (passive mode).
The proposed model does not aim to substitute Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
systems that operate in real time or near real time (Murphy, 2017) but intends to augment their 
forensic capabilities. 
3.3.2 Audit Log Filtering
Audit logs often carry additional and substantial -in volume- information that is not necessarily useful 
for a security analysis process. For instance, debug level logging produces detailed information on a 
system’s operations, which is sometimes required for troubleshooting, but does not add value to a 
forensic investigation. The Log Filtering process enables the collection of suitable data while 
disregarding the non-relevant characteristics. Considering that there may be incompatibilities among 
audit logs from different devices, the Log Filtering process utilizes a set of predefined patterns and 
filters out irrelevant information.
3.3.3 Audit Log Normalization and Validation
Normalization is the process of adapting the raw data collected from various sources into a standard 
format (Chuvakin et al., 2012). To this point, the data that pass the Log Filtering process are parsed 
and divided into components. For comparison reasons, in the proposed model, the main log 
characteristics are identical to the IoC object’s properties.
Figure 7 presents an example normalization process for an instance of an audit log produced from a 
firewall (Figure 6). Note that the IP addresses and timestamps that are among the elements of interest 
are described in a JSON representation in figure 7. Also, notice that the normalized JSON structure 
does not contain the private IP address “192.168.2.1” because the Log Filtering process filtered it.
Homogeneity of data is essential for efficient analysis. Thus, the log data to be compared against the 
collected IoCs must be accurate. Data validation processes ensure the accuracy of data and guarantee 
that similar elements have the same data format (i.e., same time format).
3.3.4 Audit Log Database and Indexing 
Unsurprisingly, modern systems produce a wealth of logs -in terms of- variety and volume. As such, 
log analysis is increasingly becoming time-consuming (Quick and Choo, 2016), requiring a more 
methodological and systematic approach in developing log analysis processes. This involves 
approaches and functions such as indexing to improve data manipulation speed (Kim et al., 2011). A 
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particular indexing method which has been shown to be suitable for offering effective analysis of 
audit log data is that of inverse indexing. 
With regards to the underlying database storage paradigm, the proposed methodology favors NoSQL 
databases as the driving storage technology because one of the main benefits they offer is their 
schema-less nature, which allows the inclusion of previously unseen data fields into the database 
schema at execution time (Moniruzzaman and Hossain, 2013). 
From a practical implementation perspective in this paper, Elasticsearch was selected as the best 
candidate tool as it provides an efficient indexing service allowing the processing of complex search 
queries (Kalyani and Mehta, 2017). 
3.4 Threat Identification Module and Intelligence Evidence Storage System 
Last but not least, the Threat Identification Module (TIM) analyzes the entries originating from both 
the Local IoC and Audit Log Databases and checks whether there are matches between them. The 
existence of a match indicates the presence of a relevant threat. In this case, the TIM keeps a backup 
of the relevant audit log records in a separate database view called the Intelligence Evidence Storage 
System (IESS). This particular database can be viewed as the result of the triage activity allowing the 
security and forensics analysis processes to obtain an initial and prioritized overview of the incidents 
that had the potential to reach the attack surface of the underlying systems successfully. This is 
particularly useful as it also considers “near misses”, which are attack events and incident that have 
taken place but were not fully successful and therefore did not raise any incident detection alerts.
TIM takes advantage of the relationships kept in the IoC database and facilitates the comparison 
process between the IoC and the Audit Log Database succeeding to uncover hidden patterns of 
threats. Figure 8 presents the algorithm the TIM uses. 
4. Implementation
The proposed framework was tested for its applicability in an operational environment with a 
prototype topology that attempted to simulate a simple office environment (SOHO). The environment 
contained three Windows 7 Virtual Machines (VMs), an OSSEC 2.9.3 (OSSEC, 2018) virtual 
appliance which was configured to act both as gateway and IDS, and a virtual appliance running the 
Ubuntu 16.04 OS hosting the Threat Intelligence Informed Digital Forensic Readiness Process 
Model. The OSSEC virtual appliance produced NetFlow, and IDS alerts of the network traffic passed 
through its interfaces. In addition, OSSEC host agents were installed on the Windows machines for 
collecting and exporting host audit logs. Both host and network audit data forwarded to the Threat 
Intelligence Informed Digital Forensic Readiness Process Model for further handling. More 
information about the implementation is given below.
4.1 IoC Collection Module
The prototype agent for the collection of IoCs from various sources was developed with Python 
programming language. This agent first obtained a list of hash values from a set of pre-configured 
data sources (Alienvault’s OTX and MalwareConfig) and verified their format. Then, it searched 
several TIPs like Virustotal for establishing relationships with relevant IoCs. This process produced 
a set of interrelated IoC objects, which were stored in a Neo4j graph database that acts as the Local 
IoC Database. Figure 9 depicts a simple instance of the IoC database. This picture shows the way 
File Object connects to other IoCs like IP Addresses, FQDNs, Mutexes, Malware instances etcetera.  
4.2 Audit Log Processing Module
The Audit Log Processing Module entails several open source tools. Audit log collection performed 
at the network level with the Bro Security Network Monitor Tool. At the host level, the OSSEC Host 
Intrusion Detection deployed agents on the Windows VMs and captured the changes made at the file 
system level.
Collected data have been forwarded to the Logstash application by Elastic, which in turn parsed, 
filtered and normalized every record it received and subsequently transformed raw entries into 
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predefined fields. These fields were similar to those of the Local IoC Database. For integrity reasons, 
Logstash kept raw data at their original state.
At the storage level, Elasticsearch was selected as the most appropriate solution due to its 
interoperability with the Logstash application and its efficient inverse indexing service, which is 
powered by the Lucene search engine. Every record pushed into Elasticsearch is automatically 
tokenized and indexed and is thus capable of instant retrieving. 
4.3 Threat Identification Module
The TIM was implemented with Python programming language. Its effectiveness relied on the 
rapidness of accessing and comparing inverse indexed tokens against the local stored IoCs. To avoid 
duplication, IESS was implemented within the Audit Log Database by introducing a set of special 
fields that acted as binary flags. The result of the TIP algorithm specifies the Audit Log Database 
entries where these flags are set, by updating the status of the relevant NoSQL documents. Finally, a 
web-based front-end interface was developed to visualize and represent as graphs the contents of the 
IESS.
5. Results and evaluation
In addition to the implementation phase discussed earlier aiming to verify the applicability of the 
proposed framework, the evaluation part aims to measure its effectiveness with appropriate data. To 
this extent, the authors chose to simulate the operation of an IDS with captured data that are part of 
the CTU-13 dataset from the Stratosphere Lab (Stratosphere Lab, 2015). It is worth highlighting that 
a recent research performed by Małowidzki et al. reported that the CTU-13 is the most valuable 
dataset to date (Małowidzki et al., 2017).
So, the first experiment is based on CTU13 – Mixed 1 dataset that was produced from an attack 
scenario simulating the operation of the Bubble Dock Malware. This malware variation is known of 
generating various intrusive third-party ads while tracking user activity. The mixed-1 dataset contains 
52374 rows with bidirectional network flows of both normal and malicious network traffic. Table 2 
depicts the structure of the dataset. 
This dataset contains fourteen fields, however, considering that the proposed methodology employs 
text comparison techniques to identify similarities between common types of IoCs stored in the 
“Local IoC” and “Audit Log” databases, it becomes clear that IP addresses are the only elements of 
this particular dataset that the TIM can use. The contents of the above-mentioned dataset have been 
imported to the Elasticsearch indexing service, which have been acting as the Audit Log Database, 
thus producing a set of 2659 unique IP addresses.
On the other side, the Local IoC Database has been populated with 1500 random MD5 hash values 
following the procedure described in section 4.1, which in turn resulted in the establishment of a 
graph containing 35000 IoCs in approximate, of which 3649 were IP addresses.
The contents of both databases compared through the TIM indicating that 13 IP addresses were in 
common and it thus updated the contents of the IESS accordingly. By querying the Local IoC 
Database, the TIM found that 19 malware samples were related with these IP addresses (Figure 10). 
Despite the increased number of these reported malware samples, the scoring algorithm of the TIM 
designated the file having an MD5 value of “2d17f8f6fab6da5619c7528e9b0ee135” as the one that 
relates most with the dataset used in the experiment. The scoring algorithm used in this experiment 
calculated the percentage of the related IP addresses of a File Object that are present in the Audit Log 
Database. The evaluation of the scenario confirmed the accuracy of the results of the experiment.
The whole process of cross-checking 3649 IP entries of the Local IoC Database against 52374 records 
contained in the Audit Log Database, obtaining related objects, running the scoring algorithm and 
presenting the results lasted approximately eight seconds (Figure 10), which is considered an 
acceptable time-frame. 
Further analysis, which performed by applying more complex queries against the Local IoC Database 
uncovered additional patterns of possible malicious activity but produced more information that need 
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to be evaluated by forensic analysts. Figure 11 presents additional relationships among the malware 
instances mentioned above (purple nodes), meaning that these interconnections can be based on other 
objects like URLs (grey nodes), FQDNs (yellow nodes) and Mutexes (blue nodes). This picture also 
indicates the increased volume of data that has been collected and elaborated during the pilot 
implementation, given that MD5 hash values was the only source of information.
The second experiment utilized the twenty-fifth dataset of the CTU scenarios. This dataset contained 
241243 rows of firewall event logs collected over a period of four months that relate to Zbot trojan 
horse family. Zbot malware samples are known for their attempts to steal confidential information 
from the compromised computers (Symantec, 2010). 
Both this dataset and the contents of the Local IoC Database fed the Threat Identification Module, 
which managed to cross-check 4157 records of the Local IoC Database against 241243 event logs 
and provide relevant results in approximately 30 seconds. Moreover, the scoring algorithm reported 
that four malware samples were the most probable instances that produced the traffic the dataset 
contains. One of those instances matched the one described in the scenario, meaning that the proposed 
framework has accurately reasoned how the incident emerged. It is also important to underline that 
the rest of the samples that have been assigned high degrees of confidence belong to the same malware 
family.
The results of the experiments mentioned above are very promising, as they indicate that the proposed 
framework can substantially narrow the information digital forensic analysts need to examine for 
uncovering patterns of malicious activity. Additionally, the transformation of data to intelligence can 
provide digital forensics specialists with important directions about existing forensic artifacts. For 
instance, the contents of the IESS can be exported in a list of IP addresses, URLs, FQDNs, file names 
and file hashes, which in turn can be imported into forensic investigation tools for accurately and 
efficiently identifying malicious activities.  
6. Conclusion
There are two key factors to evaluate for implementing a successful DFR procedure; the time needed 
to identify a potential incident, and the extreme volume of data a security analyst must examine.  In 
our days, sophisticated malware and APTs are designed to stay uncovered as long as possible for their 
exploiters to achieve their targets. The timely uncovering of such a threat is crucial, as the shortest it 
stays uncovered the less damage the target system suffers. Combined with the huge amount of data 
collected from security devices, and logs generated from local information systems an analyst needs 
to work with, compose a demanding environment with high risks. The methodology presented here 
succeeds to overcome these barriers by automating the malware uncovering procedure and thus 
reducing the time needed to take actions against a potential threat while handling all locally stored 
evidence and taking advantage of all TI accumulating in across various TIPs.
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Figure 1. The Threat Intelligence Informed Digital Forensic Readiness Process Model 
192x124mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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Figure 2. Number and types of IoCs hosted in Alienvault TIP 
155x62mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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Figure 3. Number and types of IoCs hosted at Threatconnect TIP 
173x58mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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Figure 4. Relationships between IP Address and Datasource Objects 
186x118mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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Figure 5. The Local IoC Database Schema 
149x128mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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Figure 6. Sample Raw Audit Log data produced by Netscreen Firewall 
149x20mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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Figure 7. Normalized Netscreen Firewall event log in JSON format 
175x61mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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Figure 8. The Algorithm of the Threat Identification Module 
154x200mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
Page 20 of 25Information and Computer Security
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Inform
ation and Com
puter Security
 
Figure 9. Relationships among IoCs in the Local IoC Database 
1229x694mm (72 x 72 DPI) 
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Figure 10. Results of the Threat Identification Module on CTU-13 – Mixed1 dataset 
183x89mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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Figure 11. Graph produced after more in-depth analysis 
388x342mm (300 x 300 DPI) 
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Nr. SOURCE WEBSITE HASH 
IP 
ADDRESS 
URL FQDN FILENAME EMAIL MUTEX REGISTRY 
1 Abuse.ch https://abuse.ch   X X X         
2 AlienVault OTX https://otx.alienvault.com X X X X   X X   
3 Bambenek Source http://osint.bambenekconsulting.com/feeds   X   X         
4 BotScout https://botscout.com   X       X     
5 Botvrij https://botvrij.eu X X X X         
6 CI Army List http://cinsscore.com/list/ci-badguys.txt   X             
7 Cryptam https://www.cryptam.com X               
8 Cybercrime Tracker http://cybercrime-tracker.net   X X           
9 Firehol IP Lists http://iplists.firehol.org   X             
10 GreenSnow https://greensnow.co   X             
11 Hybrid Analysis https://www.hybrid-analysis.com X X X X X       
12 Malshare https://malshare.com X               
13 MalwareConfig https://malwareconfig.com X X   X     X   
14 MalwareDomainList http://www.malwaredomainlist.com   X   X         
15 MalwareDomains http://www.malwaredomains.com       X         
16 OpenPhish https://openphish.com     X           
17 PhishTank https://www.phishtank.com     X           
18 Sarvam http://sarvam.ece.ucsb.edu X               
19 ThreatCrowd https://www.threatcrowd.org X X X X         
20 ThreatMiner https://www.threatminer.org X X X X X X X X 
21 VirusShare https://virusshare.com X               
22 Virussign http://www.virusign.com X               
23 Vxvault http://vxvault.net X X X           
24 VirScan www.virscan.org X       X       
Totals 13 15 10 10 3 3 3 1 
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Field Description
StartTime Record start time
Dur Duration of a flow
Proto Transaction protocol.
SrcAddr Source IP address
Sport Source port
Dir Direction of transaction
DstAddr Destination IP address
Dport Destination port
State Transaction State
STos Source TOS byte value.
dTos Destination TOS byte value.
TotPkts Total transaction packet count.
TotBytes Total transaction bytes
SrcBytes Bytes sent from source to destination
SrcUdata Data sent from source to destination
dstUdata Data sent from destination to host
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